When all Il-28 offensive missiles and light bombers were withdrawn from Cuba on 20 November 1962, the blockade formally ended. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union highlighted the need for a fast, clear and direct line of communication between the two superpowers. As a result, the Moscow-Washington helpline was set up. A number of agreements then reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union for several years, until both sides began to further develop their nuclear arsenals. The 27th Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, now known as the Armageddon Letter (dated the day before), interpreted as calling for the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack on Cuba:[114] "I believe that the aggressiveness of the imperialists is extremely dangerous and that they are effectively practicing the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and international morality. This would be the time to eliminate this danger forever through a clear act of self-defense, no matter how harsh and terrible the solution may be," Castro wrote. [115] In October 1962, a U.S. U-2 spy plane secretly photographed Soviet-built nuclear missile sites on the island of Cuba. President Kennedy did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to know that he had discovered the missiles. He met with his advisers in secret for several days to discuss the problem. With the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the United States became concerned about the spread of communism.

A Latin American country that openly allied itself with the Soviet Union was deemed unacceptable by the United States. It would oppose, for example, the Monroe Doctrine, an American policy that limits U.S. participation in colonies and European affairs, but keeps the Western Hemisphere within U.S. sphere of influence. Later that day, what the White House later called "Black Saturday," the U.S. Navy launched a series of "signaling" deep loads (training loads the size of hand grenades)[116] at a Soviet submarine (B-59) on the blocking line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear torpedo, orders to use it, if the submarine has been damaged by deep charges or surface fires. [117] As the submarine was too deep to monitor radio traffic,[118][119] B-59 captain Valentin Grigorievich Savitsky decided that a war might have already begun and wanted to fire a nuclear torpedo. [120] The decision to launch them required the agreement of the three officers on board, but one of them, Vasily Archipov, was contradicted and the nuclear launch was therefore narrowly avoided.

In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces had already received tactical nuclear warheads in Cuba for their artillery missiles and Il-28 bombers when the crisis erupted. [155] Castro said he would have recommended their use if the U.S. had entered despite Cuba`s destruction. [155] BBC journalist Joe Matthews published on October 13, 2012 the story behind the 100 tactical warheads that Graham Allison mentions in the excerpt above. [160] Khrushchev feared that Castro`s wounded pride and widespread Cuban outrage at the concessions he had made to Kennedy would lead to the failure of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. . . .

When all Il-28 offensive missiles and light bombers were withdrawn from Cuba on 20 November 1962, the blockade formally ended. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union highlighted the need for a fast, clear and direct line of communication between the two superpowers. As a result, the Moscow-Washington helpline was set up. A number of agreements then reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union for several years, until both sides began to further develop their nuclear arsenals. The 27th Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, now known as the Armageddon Letter (dated the day before), interpreted as calling for the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack on Cuba:[114] "I believe that the aggressiveness of the imperialists is extremely dangerous and that they are effectively practicing the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and international morality. This would be the time to eliminate this danger forever through a clear act of self-defense, no matter how harsh and terrible the solution may be," Castro wrote. [115] In October 1962, a U.S. U-2 spy plane secretly photographed Soviet-built nuclear missile sites on the island of Cuba. President Kennedy did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to know that he had discovered the missiles. He met with his advisers in secret for several days to discuss the problem. With the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the United States became concerned about the spread of communism.

A Latin American country that openly allied itself with the Soviet Union was deemed unacceptable by the United States. It would oppose, for example, the Monroe Doctrine, an American policy that limits U.S. participation in colonies and European affairs, but keeps the Western Hemisphere within U.S. sphere of influence. Later that day, what the White House later called "Black Saturday," the U.S. Navy launched a series of "signaling" deep loads (training loads the size of hand grenades)[116] at a Soviet submarine (B-59) on the blocking line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear torpedo, orders to use it, if the submarine has been damaged by deep charges or surface fires. [117] As the submarine was too deep to monitor radio traffic,[118][119] B-59 captain Valentin Grigorievich Savitsky decided that a war might have already begun and wanted to fire a nuclear torpedo. [120] The decision to launch them required the agreement of the three officers on board, but one of them, Vasily Archipov, was contradicted and the nuclear launch was therefore narrowly avoided.

In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces had already received tactical nuclear warheads in Cuba for their artillery missiles and Il-28 bombers when the crisis erupted. [155] Castro said he would have recommended their use if the U.S. had entered despite Cuba`s destruction. [155] BBC journalist Joe Matthews published on October 13, 2012 the story behind the 100 tactical warheads that Graham Allison mentions in the excerpt above. [160] Khrushchev feared that Castro`s wounded pride and widespread Cuban outrage at the concessions he had made to Kennedy would lead to the failure of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. . . .

When all Il-28 offensive missiles and light bombers were withdrawn from Cuba on 20 November 1962, the blockade formally ended. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union highlighted the need for a fast, clear and direct line of communication between the two superpowers. As a result, the Moscow-Washington helpline was set up. A number of agreements then reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union for several years, until both sides began to further develop their nuclear arsenals. The 27th Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, now known as the Armageddon Letter (dated the day before), interpreted as calling for the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack on Cuba:[114] "I believe that the aggressiveness of the imperialists is extremely dangerous and that they are effectively practicing the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and international morality. This would be the time to eliminate this danger forever through a clear act of self-defense, no matter how harsh and terrible the solution may be," Castro wrote. [115] In October 1962, a U.S. U-2 spy plane secretly photographed Soviet-built nuclear missile sites on the island of Cuba. President Kennedy did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to know that he had discovered the missiles. He met with his advisers in secret for several days to discuss the problem. With the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the United States became concerned about the spread of communism.

A Latin American country that openly allied itself with the Soviet Union was deemed unacceptable by the United States. It would oppose, for example, the Monroe Doctrine, an American policy that limits U.S. participation in colonies and European affairs, but keeps the Western Hemisphere within U.S. sphere of influence. Later that day, what the White House later called "Black Saturday," the U.S. Navy launched a series of "signaling" deep loads (training loads the size of hand grenades)[116] at a Soviet submarine (B-59) on the blocking line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear torpedo, orders to use it, if the submarine has been damaged by deep charges or surface fires. [117] As the submarine was too deep to monitor radio traffic,[118][119] B-59 captain Valentin Grigorievich Savitsky decided that a war might have already begun and wanted to fire a nuclear torpedo. [120] The decision to launch them required the agreement of the three officers on board, but one of them, Vasily Archipov, was contradicted and the nuclear launch was therefore narrowly avoided.

In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces had already received tactical nuclear warheads in Cuba for their artillery missiles and Il-28 bombers when the crisis erupted. [155] Castro said he would have recommended their use if the U.S. had entered despite Cuba`s destruction. [155] BBC journalist Joe Matthews published on October 13, 2012 the story behind the 100 tactical warheads that Graham Allison mentions in the excerpt above. [160] Khrushchev feared that Castro`s wounded pride and widespread Cuban outrage at the concessions he had made to Kennedy would lead to the failure of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. . . .